Audience 1  1:14  

My question concerns your repurchase of Berkshire shares. In the third quarter of last year, you spent almost $1 billion buying Berkshire B stock at an average price of $207. But then you got to a period between December 26 and April 11, when the stock languished for almost four months under $207, even as you were sitting on an enormous pile of $112 billion. 

My question is: Why did you not repurchase a lot more stock? Unless of course, there was for a time an acquisition of say, $80 billion to $90 billion on your radar.

Warren Buffett  1:59  

Yeah, the question whether we had $100 billion or $200 billion would not make a difference, or $50 billion would not make a difference in our approach to repurchase shares. We used to have a policy of tying it to book value, but that became really obsolete.

The real thing is to buy stock, repurchase shares only when you think you’re doing it at a price where the remaining shareholders are worth more than the moment after you repurchase it than they were the moment before. 

It’s very much like to be running a partnership, and you had three partners enter the business that was worth $3 million. One of the partners came and said, “I’d like you to buy back my share of the partnership for $1.1 million.” We said, “Forget it.” 

And then he said, “$1 million we’d probably say forget it.” He said, “$900,000, we’d take it because at that point, the remaining business would be worth $2,000,001. We have two owners and our interest in value would have gone from $1 million to $1,050,000. 

It’s very simple arithmetic. Most companies adopt repurchase programs, and they just say we’re going to spend so much. That’s like saying, “We’re going to buy X, Y, Z stock and we’re going to spend so much. We’re going to buy a company. We’re going to spend whatever it takes. We will buy stock when we think it is selling below a conservative estimate of its intrinsic value. 

Now, the intrinsic value is not a specific point. It’s probably a range in my mind. It might have a band, maybe at 10%. Charlie would have a band. That was mine. It would probably be 10%. Ours would not be identical, but they’d be very close. 

Sometimes he might figure a bit higher than I do. It may be a bit lower. But we want to be sure when we repurchase shares that those people who have not sold shares are better off than they were before we repurchase them. 

In the first quarter of the year, they’ll find that we bought something over a billion dollars worth of stock. That’s nothing like my ambitions. What that means is that we feel that we’re okay by it, but we don’t salivate over buying. We think that the shares we repurchase in the first quarter will leave the shareholders better off than if we hadn’t.

We don’t think the difference is dramatic. You could easily see periods where we would spend very substantial sums if we thought the stock was selling, I’d say at 25% or 30% less than it was worth. We didn’t have something else that was even better. But we have no ambition in any given quarter to spend a dime unless we think you’re going to be better off for us having done so. Charlie?

Charlie Munger  5:08  

Well, I predicted we’ll get a little more liberal in repurchasing chairs.

Warren Buffet  5:17  

I was going to give you a full time.

Stig Brodersen 5:23  

Oh boy, how can you not just love Charlie Munger? In the first quarter of 2019, Berkshire bought back $1.7 billion back in shares. This is more than in 2018 altogether. It sounds like it’s a lot of shares. But for a company with over $500 billion in market cap, it’s not really moving the needle. 

However, I think if you are an investor, it has a few important implications. The first one might be obvious in a sense that Warren Buffett thinks that the stock is slightly undervalued compared to the market conditions. If you want to be fully invested in equities with a strong focus on protecting your downside, Berkshire might be an option. 

Especially because Warren Buffett hints at using substantial sums if the stock is undervalued at 25% to 30%. If he does not have any other place where you can put the money, you would likely go into Berkshire, which again, is a protection for you on the downside.

Another question that was played here during the meeting is that they even talked about putting as much as $100 billion and buying back shares. I don’t think you should be caught up to two months in the numbers. That’s really not the point. Warren Buffett is ready to put all the money to the best possible use. That is also the reason why he does not want to allocate a fixed amount every year for share repurchase.

Many other companies are doing it because it is very interesting. If you go through various earnings calls, you can hear so many times from management saying that the mind had paid out, say $500 million in dividends, and then bought back shares for another $500 million. And then they’re saying they’re proud of paying back or rewarding their investors with $1 billion for that quarter. 

For a value investor, that is sort of nonsense. I mean, if the $1 billion could be put to better use by reinvesting in the business or making an acquisition, you’re really not paying back the investor. You’re actually destroying investor value.

I think that the final indication is really how much the size of Berkshire Hathaway is constraining Warren Buffett. If you have $100 billion in cash, there’s just a limited amount of options for you. 

You can’t put $100 billion to work in too many public companies. One of the very few you can do that with is a company like Berkshire. Buying back shares might mean that this is the best way to put the money into use, but it is in a very limited universe.

Preston Pysh  8:06  

Stig, I’ll be honest with you. This response was just, I don’t know, I was pretty frustrated listening to this. It’s not anything new that we haven’t heard from previous shareholders meetings. I’m pretty sure you could pull up any shareholders’ meeting for the last 20 years, [and] you’re going to hear him talk about share repurchases, how the price has to be right and has to have the right intrinsic value or else they’re not going to do it to bring shareholder value for the existing owners. He says that all the time. 

But Carol’s question here I thought was extremely well-framed. I think it was well-framed in the fact that she’s addressing the fact that he just keeps growing his cash pile. He’s not buying any companies with it. He’s not even buying his own stock with it. What she’s really getting at is if you’re going to buy a little bit. In a little bit, I mean a billion, that is a little bit in the grand scheme of how much he’s sitting on.

He’s sitting over $100 billion. When you talk about it as a percent, that’s less than 1% of buying his own stock back. If you’re going to buy less than 1%, why not buy 10% or 20%? You know what it is that you’re buying. 

It’s just a little confusing. It sends mixed messages to the marketplace. Are you buying it because you think of its value? Are you buying it for some other reason that just doesn’t make any sense at all? I was just very frustrated with his response. 

I think when he handed over to Charlie, his response was, “I don’t want to answer it” is really what he was doing. He just baton the question away as if he doesn’t have to respond to it. 

I think that they do need to respond to it because what they’re effectively choosing is they’re saying, “I think my cash gives me a better position than buying back my own stock.” I don’t know how else you could see it any other way. That’s just me. 

I think that their actions speak way louder than their words here. I just think this was such a terrible response to such an important question. I’ve been looking at their actions for a couple of years now. It doesn’t seem like they have a good response to it. 

I will say this on their behalf. A lot of the time, they don’t like to publicly talk about why they are putting on certain positions. This position of cash, maybe they think is very advantageous to not be telling the market why they’re sitting on so much cash in there. 

They’re valuing the optionality of that cash for some reason. I think it’s important to pay attention to that. Although I’m frustrated with their lack of telling people why they’re doing what they’re doing, I am paying close attention to what they’re doing and trying to understand it for myself. 

Alright, so I don’t have anything else to add for this one. We’ll just go ahead and play the next question here.

Audience 2  11:16  

This question comes from Vincent James of Munich, Germany. There has been a lot written about the recent impairment charge at Kraft Heinz. You were quoted just stating that you recognize that Berkshire overpaid for Kraft Heinz. 

Currently, major retail chains are being more aggressive in developing house brands. Amazon has announced intentions to launch grocery outlets being that as Mr. Bezos has often stated, “Your margin is my opportunity.” 

The more fundamental question related to Kraft Heinz may be whether the advantages of the large brands and zero-based budgeting that 3g is applied are appropriate and defensible at all on consumer foods. 

In other words, will traditional consumer good brands in general, and Kraft Heinz in particular, have any moat in their future? My question is, to what extent do the changing dynamics in the consumer food market change your view on the long term potential for Kraft Heinz?

Warren Buffett  12:16  

Actually, what I said was we paid too much for Kraft. The highest part of the transaction when we originally owned about half of Heinz. We paid an appropriate price there. We actually did what we had some preferred reading, and so on. We paid too much money for Kraft. 

To some extent, our own actions had driven up the prices of Kraft Heinz. The profits of that business is $6 billion. Roughly, I’m projecting this. I’m not making a forecast. But $6 billion pre tax on $7 billion of tangible assets is a wonderful business. You can’t pay too much for a wonderful business.

We bought See’s Candies, and we made a great purchase as it turned out. We could have paid more. But there’s some price at which we could have bought even See’s Candies, and it wouldn’t work. The business does not know how much you paid for it. I mean, it’s going to earn based on its fundamentals. We paid too much for the Kraft side of Kraft Heinz.

Additionally, the profitability has basically been improved in those operations over the way they were operating before. You’re quite correct. Amazon itself has become a brand. Kirkland at Costco is a $39 billion brand. All of Kraft Heinz is $26 billion. It’s been from hindsight and has been around for 150 years.

It has advertised billions and billions of dollars in terms of their products. They go through 10s of thousands of outlets, and here’s somebody like Costco that establishes a brand called Kirkland. It’s doing $39 billion more than virtually any food company.

That brand moves from product to product. It is terrific if a brand travels. Coca-Cola moves it from Coke to Cherry Coke, and Coke Zero, and so on. To have a brand that can really move, and Kirkland does more business than Coca-Cola does. 

Kirkland operates through 775 or so stores. I call them warehouses at Costco. Coca-Cola’s has millions of distribution outlets. The retailer, and the brands have always struggled as to who gets the upper hand in moving a product to the consumers. 

There’s no question in my mind that the position of the retailer relative to the brands varies enormously around the world, or in different countries. You’ve had 35% even maybe 40% of private label brands and soft drinks. It’s never gotten anywhere close to that in the United States. It varies a lot.

Basically, certain retailers and retail systems have gained some power. Particularly, in the case of Amazon, Walmart, Costco, and their reaction to it, Kraft Heinz is still doing very well operationally. But we paid too much.

Charlie Munger   15:28  

Well, it’s not a tragedy. In the other two transactions, one worked wonderfully, while the other didn’t work so well. That happens.

Warren Buffett 15:39  

There can always be mistakes made when you’ve got places in your rearranging, or reorganizing them to do more business with them with the same number of people. We like buying businesses that are efficient to start with, but the operations of Kraft Heinz have been improved under the present management over all. But we paid a very high price in terms of the Kraft part. We paid an appropriate price in terms of Heinz.

Stig Brodersen 16:10

Very interesting response. Back in 2015, Berkshire bought Kraft Heinz together with 3D Capital. I know it’s quite easy for us to say here in hindsight, but for quite a few value investors, it was sort of a big surprise how much Buffett really paid.

At the time, it was around 25 times earnings of a company with a mid-digit growth. It was not coming from an outlook of ramping up that growth. For instance, for Heinz, a 20% premium to the price was added before the deal. 

Since then, you had an impairment charge of a little more than $15 billion. This is primarily related to the US refrigerated food in Canadian retail divisions, and the trademarks for Kraft and Oscar Mayer’s. 

The payment charged is really that the value of that has been written down. You will have that less equity as an investor. That being said, I think it’s so liberating to hear the CEO of a huge company being so upfront and being completely honest with their mistake. It’s so rare these days.

Preston Pysh  17:18  

Stig, I don’t know that I really have too much to add to what was said during this one. I think that it’s just important for people to hear his thought process, and how he can reanalyze himself objectively. I think that that’s probably his super strength here. He can look at himself objectively, and say, “Hey, this was a good decision. This was a bad decision,” unemotionally. 

Many people can’t do that. I think that that’s such an important part of his secret sauce of who he is and why he became who he is. That is because he’s able to do that. Let’s go ahead and jump to the next question here.

Audience 3  17:56  

I’m 27 years old. I’m aspiring to be a great money manager like you two one day. My question to both of you is how did you know you were ready to manage other people’s money?

Warren Buffet  18:13  

It’s a very interesting question because I have faced that. I sold securities for a while. In May of 1956, I had a number of members of my family. I’d come back from New York. They wanted me to help them out with stocks as I had earlier before I’d taken a job in New York. I said, “I did not want to get into the stock sales business.

I enjoyed investing. I was glad to figure out a way to do it, which I did through a partnership form. I would not have done that if I thought that there was any chance that I would lose the money. What I was worried about was not how I would behave, but how they would behave.

I needed people who were in sync with me. We sat down for dinner in May of 1956 with seven people. They were either related to me, or one was a roommate in college and his mother. I showed him the partnership agreement. I said, “You don’t need to read this.” I said, “Here are the ground rules as to what I think I can do and how I want to be judged. If you’re in sync with me, I’m going to manage your money.”

I won’t worry about the fact that you will panic if the market goes down, or if somebody tells you something different. We have to be on the same page. If we’re on the same page, then I’m not worried about managing your money. If we aren’t on the same page, I don’t want to manage your money because you may be disappointed when I think that things are even better to be investing, and so on.

I don’t think you want to manage other people’s money until you have a vehicle, and can reach the kind of people that will be in sync with you. I think you ought to have your own ground rules as to what your expectations are – when they should send you roses, and when they should throw bricks at you.

My father-in-law gave me everything he had in the world. I didn’t mind taking everything he had in the world, as long as he would stick with me. I wouldn’t get panicked by headlines. It’s enormously important that you don’t take people that have expectations of you that you can’t meet.That means that you turn down a lot of people. 

You’d probably start very small and get an audited record. When you’ve got some confidence where your own parents came to you and were going to give you all their money that you were going to invest for them. When you’ve got the kind of confidence to say, “I may not get the best record but I’ll be sure that you get a decent record over time as when you’re ready to go on it.”

Charlie Munger 20:40  

Let me tell you a story that I tell young lawyers who frequently come to me and say how can I quit practicing law and become a billionaire instead? I’d say, “Well, it reminds me of a story I would tell about Mozart.” A young man came to me and he said: “I want to compose symphonies. I want to talk to you about that. Mozart said: “How old are you?” The man said: “22.” 

Mozart said: “You’re too young to do symphonies.” The guy said: “But you were writing symphonies, when you were 10 years old.” He says: “Yes, but I wasn’t running around asking other people how to do it.”

Warren Buffet  21:21  

We wish you well. Actually, we really do. Because the fact you asked that sort of a question is to some extent indicative of the fact that you got the right attitude going in.

Charlie Munger  21:36  

It isn’t that easy to be a great investor. I don’t think we’ve made it.

Stig Brodersen 21:42

Munger is being a little harsh here. I don’t think there’s any issue with asking more experienced people for advice. There were quite a few questions at any Berkshire Hathaway shareholders meeting. It is more like, “Tell me when I should invest. I don’t want to put in the work to find the very best stocks.” 

It’s just hard to find any successful money manager for good reasons, who are giving away that information for free. I really love Buffett’s response here. For many of our listeners, I considered a career in money management at some point in time. I think Buffett’s response really explains to us why so few people are eventually successful.

99+% of corporate jobs in the money management industry are really in an environment where you’re not truly matching the expectations with the investors. You really can’t remove that noise and that pressure from yourself. Having that on you is just going to be very difficult to be successful.

Preston Pysh  22:44  

Buffett has a quote that goes, “I’m a better investor because I’m a business owner. And I’m a much better business owner because I’m an investor.” The gentleman asked about becoming an investment advisor or doing a partnership kind of like what Buffett had done when managing other people’s money. 

I would argue that one of the things that made Buffett so strong at understanding how investing works and finding these companies is because when he was a kid, going back to the Mozart example when he was 10 years old, Buffett in his teens was throwing more newspapers than any other kid in America.

He was making tons of money as a kid. He was owning businesses. He had pinball machines. He was doing all sorts of business ventures. He was wired for it from the very beginning. He grew up with a business mind in the way he thinks about things. 

He didn’t start off thinking that I’m going to be the “Nothing but stocks. Give me other people’s money so that I can invest that in this passive way of owning businesses.” No, he had a business. The pinball story is unbelievable. If you’ve never heard the pinball story, I’d look that up and dig into it more. 

Buffett was running his own micro businesses. He understood what it was to have a top line. He knew what it was to have net income or profit at the end of his expenses. I think whenever you do that and you run a small business, you just approach your investments from a completely different lens than somebody who went off to school, and maybe never ran a business ever. They’re trying to buy passive investments.

They’ve never run anything operationally. Buffett had. It’s always interesting to hear Charlie tell the Mozart story. He really likes telling that. I think I’ve heard him say that almost every single shareholder meeting that I’ve ever gone to. 

I think it’s an important story because there’s a lot of truth to that. You have to be the person who’s going out there, trying to get after it, and trying to build your own business. You got to learn from other people but at the same time, you’ve got to have some experience of your own. I think that’s really kind of the point.

Alright, so I don’t have anything else to add for this one. We’ll just go ahead and play the next question here.

Audience 4  25:19  

I have a question on technology and the company’s biggest holding now. Given that Apple is now our largest holding, tell us more about your thinking. What do you think about the regulatory challenges the company faces? 

For example, Spotify has filed a complaint against Apple in Europe on antitrust grounds. Elizabeth Warren has proposed ending Apple’s control over the App Store, which would impact the company’s strategy to increase its services businesses. Are these criticisms fair?

Warren Buffett  25:47  

I will tell you that all of the points you’ve made, I’m aware of. I like our Apple holdings very much. It is our largest holdings. Actually, what hurts in the case of Apple is that the stock has gone up. We’d much rather have the stock. I’m not proposing anything. 

We’d much rather have the stock at a lower price so we can buy more stock. Importantly, I think Apple authorized another $75 billion the other day. Let’s say they’re going to spend $100 billion in buying their stock in the next three years. It’s very simple. If they buy it at $200, they’re going to get $500 million shares. 

I got $4,600,000,000 out now. They’ll end up with $4.1 billion under that circumstance. They’re buying it at $150. They buy in $667 million shares. Instead of owning what we would own in the first case, the divisor would be less than $4 billion. We don’t own a greater percentage of it. 

In effect, a major portion of earnings, at least possibly it’s been authorized, will be spent in terms of increasing our ownership without us paying out a dime, which I love for a business. It’s a wonderful business. The recent development in the stock which has moved up substantially, actually hurts Berkshire over time. 

In my opinion, we’ll do fine. We’re not going to dissect our expectations about Apple for people who may be buying it against us tomorrow, or something to start with. We don’t give away investment advice on that. All the things you’ve mentioned, obviously, we know about. We’ve got a whole bunch of other variables that we crank into it. We like the fact that it’s our largest holding. Charlie?

Charlie Munger  27:47  

Well, in my family, people have Apple phones. It’s the last thing they’ll give up.

Warren Buffet  27:53  

It’s not a bad item to have.

Stig Brodersen 27:55  

They’re interesting responses. Apple is by far Berkshire Hathaway’s largest equity holding. It’s worth around $40 billion. It’s more than 20% of the total equity portfolio. 

As you could tell, Buffett’s not too happy about commenting on the operational challenges. This is not really because it’s Apple. He has that as a very general rule. The key really to understand his response is also to understand the bigger picture of Berkshire’s value, and how Apple and his other top holdings play into this.

It was sort of interesting to hear Buffett’s take on share repurchase. It’s not just because Apple just approved a $75 billion buyback program but because Tim Cook as the CEO of Apple had a conversation with Warren Buffett about that. 

He actually said to Becky Quick from CNBC not too long ago that he had a list of the smartest people to guide him in various fields. On top of that list, when it came to stock buyback, that was Warren Buffett. He got his number, and gave Buffett a call. He was like, “I don’t know if he’s going to pick up but he did.” He said he was very grateful for Buffett’s advice. 

That being said, I think, is important to understand how to read Buffett’s portfolio. Stocks are reported on a mark to market basis. The price that is reported on the final day of that quarter is directly reflected into the stated earnings of that company. That’s simply just the accounting rules. 

For instance, for the first quarter here in 2019, the stock market has soared. Buffett has reported $21.7 billion in profit, compared to a loss of $1.1 billion last year. Those numbers are more or less irrelevant. A lot of that comes from Buffett’s top portfolio that performed really well.

The number you should rather be looking for is the operating earnings. It is the earnings from all the businesses that Berkshire Hathaway owns. It is worth more than Berkshire’s entire equity portfolio. That number shows that the operating earnings is $5.5 billion. It has a modest 5% growth year over year.

If you want to focus on his stock portfolio, my suggestion is to focus on the top 10 of his holdings since the value of those are more than 80% of his total portfolio. One of the key takeaways is that accounting for operating businesses is somewhat stable whenever it comes from equities. It’s just all over the place. 

Apple has soared 30% this year. That will move the reported earnings in the short term but not change the overall intrinsic value of Berkshire Hathaway.

Preston Pysh  30:40  

For this one Stig, I don’t really have too much to add, based on what you had said. The only thing that I would say is that whenever I’m looking at Apple today, I’m just trying to do my own intrinsic value on what I think that this thing’s worth. He’s talking about Apple plowing a lot of their free cash flow. There’s a lot of their liquidity back into the business through share repurchases.

I look at the current price having way better opportunity than the rest of the S&P 500. As far as the yield, I think you’re getting a much higher yield by repurchasing Apple stock than when you are investing that in the S&P 500 as an index. It’s probably about twice to three times the return as the S&P 500. 

Those are great things. You can see why Buffett is really happy about that. It doesn’t involve him using his own liquidity in order to do it. He can protect that optionality of his cash yet Apple is just reinvesting in itself. That’s going to be good for him. You can see why he’s probably pretty happy about that idea. 

Alright, so let’s go ahead and move out of this segment where we’re covering the Berkshire meeting. We’ll go into a question from the audience.

Stig Brodersen 31:52  

I hope you won’t be too disappointed in the responses from Preston and I, now that you’ve listened to Buffett and Munger. This question comes from Paul.

Audience 5  32:01  

Hi Preston and Stig, this is Paul from London. I’ve been looking at a company for a while now. From what I can tell, the fundamentals are quite good. However, in the last year, I noticed this company taking on a tremendous amount of debt. It has a large portion of debt used to fuel stock buyback. I’m not quite sure how to interpret this. 

Can you please share your thoughts behind leveraged buybacks, whether this might be a red flag, or perhaps something else? I love your show. Keep up the good work.

Stig Brodersen  32:26  

I think this is a great question, Paul. Especially at a time where buybacks are at an all- time high. I think they are in a situation where leveraged buybacks can make sense. There are so few cases. My general rule is that unless you’re really certain that management is a very good capital allocator, it’s a red flag. 

Today with a high valuation, you might already question why you want to buy back stock in the first place for so many companies. If that’s even fueled by debt, I would be even more concerned. It’s really hard for me to come up with a rule for how often leverage buyback is a wise decision, but it’s definitely single digit. 

One example I’d like to highlight for leveraged buyback is Bed, Bath and Beyond. It’s fiscal year 2015. They took on $1.5 billion in debt. They more or less used all that for buybacks. They actually repurchased for $2.2 billion.

Including the income that they generated, more or less everything was just put into buying back stock. They bought back shares primarily in the 60’s range, and even the 70’s. At a time where the company was competing fiercely with Amazon, it was squeezed and needed to reinvest in their own business. What has happened since? 

The business is now seeing severely declining profits. It was trading at $10 not too long ago. To really just sum it up, Paul, unless you can make a conservative valuation of the company, you find it severely undervalued, and you know that the management has a good track record for being good care allocators, I would like to stay away from the company. It might be the first sign of a less competent management that is too short term-focused.

Preston Pysh  34:09  

I have to agree with Stig here. I don’t think that it’s a good sign when you see a company acting that way. I think it might also be that you’re seeing so many buybacks right now. I think with interest rates as low as they are, you’re seeing companies that feel like maybe they can pull this off without too much of a concern where they’re basically borrowing money than they’re paying a dividend. They’re just acting strange like this. 

I just don’t think that it’s good fundamentals. I think that it’s something that should definitely raise some red flags. I would love to know the ticker so that I could give you better advice than just generic advice. I definitely think it’s something that should be on your radar and something that you should pay very close attention to. 

The only caveat that I would add to that is it obviously comes down to knowing how much the company is borrowing relative to their ability to operationally quickly pay that off. How much other debt does that business have? 

If they don’t have a lot of debt in other areas, or if they can easily say that their debt to equity ratio is really low, or if they have a very reasonable current ratio, those kinds of things would give you an idea of how much is too much. 

You just gotta take it all. This is why we say you can’t use just one metric or one ratio in order to determine whether something’s good or bad. You have to kind of look at all the interdependencies of these variables. But I would look at some of those kinds of things to help you determine whether it’s a little too much. 

Alright, Paul, as a token of our appreciation, we’re going to give you access to one of our free courses on the TIP Academy page on our website. The course that we’re going to give you is our Intrinsic Value course. 

Our Intrinsic Value course teaches people how to determine the value of an individual stock. It also teaches you how to think about the market cycle when you’re buying your stock. It also teaches you some stuff about options trading. We’re really excited to give you this course.

If anybody else out there wants to check out the course, you can go to tipintrinsicvalue.com, or you can just go to our website and click on Academy. It’s the link at the top of the page. It courses right there. 

If anyone else wants to leave a question on the show, go to asktheinvestors.com. If your question gets played on the show, you’ll get a free course.

Stig Brodersen 36:25  

Alright guys, that was all that Preston and I had for this week’s episode of The Investor’s Podcast. We really look forward to playing the second episode about this year’s Berkshire Hathaway’s Annual Shareholders Meeting next week.

Outro 36:37  

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